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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BARBARA FIFE, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
NORMAN FIFE, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
: Case No. 20452 
: Case Priority 13.b. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in dividing 
the marital property of the parties? 
II 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding 
permanent alimony in the sum of $400.00 per month? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Barbara Fife filed this action for divorce on October 
4, 1983, (R.2), after having been married to Norman Fife 
since November 27, 1957, (R.356). At the trial held on July 
31, 1984, the parties stipulated Mrs. Fife would be awarded 
the custody of the only minor child remaining at home (R.256) 
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but the issues of child support, alimony and property 
division were to be decided by the judge presiding, the 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, 
After listening to the evidence, Judge Frederick ruled 
from the bench concerning the issues before the Court. Mrs. 
Fife's counsel then prepared proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce and submitted 
copies thereof to Mr. Fife's counsel on or about August 28, 
1984 (R.125). Mrs. Fife's counsel contacted Mr. Fife's 
counsel on or about September 15, 1984, concerning the 
foregoing pleadings and was advised specific objections or 
amended documents would be immediately forthcoming (R.125). 
No objections or proposed amended documents were submitted by 
Mr. Fife's counsel (R.125). Mrs. Fife's counsel mailed an 
Affidavit to Mr. Fife's counsel on October 5, 1984, regarding 
her attempts to finalize the pleadings (R.126). On October 
9, 1984, the Trial Court entered Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce (R.127-141). 
On October 15, 1984, Mr. Fife's counsel filed 
objections to the Findings, Conclusions and Decree already 
entered by the Court (R.142). On November 8, 1984, a hearing 
was held on those objections and the Court ordered the 
parties' counsel to confer to resolve the issues raised by 
the objections (R.164). On December 28, 1984, the Court 
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entered Second Amended Findings, Conclusions and Decree 
(R.168-183). Mr. Fife filed his notice of appeal on January 
28, 1985 (R.187) after trial counsel for both parties had 
withdrawn (R.184,185). 
On March 28, 1985, the Supreme Court ordered the case 
be remanded (R.227) apparently for consideration of Mr. 
Fife's Rule 60(b) Motion dated March 22, 1985 (R.225). A 
hearing on that Motion was scheduled for April 22, 1985, 
(R.245) but was continued, ex parte, without date by Mr. 
Fife's second counsel (R.250). In the interim, judgment for 
several matters set forth in the Decree was obtained in a 
hearing on March 25, 1985 (R.247,248). On January 30, 1986, 
Mr. Fife's second counsel withdrew (See Court's file) and Mr. 
Fife's present counsel appeared as a matter of record on 
March 27, 1986. A hearing was held on May 19, 1986, 
concerning the Rule 60(b) Motion and the Motion was denied. 
No appeal of denial of that Motion has been pursued. 
At the time of trial, Barbara Fife was forty-eight (48) 
years old (R.356) and the mother of four children by her 
marriage to Norman Fife (R.357). Mrs. Fife is a high school 
graduate (R.360) and attended college at Brigham Young 
University from 1953 through 1955 but did not obtain a degree 
(R.361). From the inception of the parties' marriage through 
1977, Mrs. Fife's primary occupation was that of wife, mother 
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and homemaker (R.361). The parties did discuss the 
possibility of Mrs. Fife seeking employment but Mr. Fife did 
not want her to work outside the home and asserted "If you 
want to earn the living, then I will stay home with the 
kids."(R.361). 
In 1977, Mrs. Fife began working for K-Mart on a part-
time basis (R.360) and continued working on such a basis 
until she filed for divorce when she commenced working full-
time (R.360). Mrs. Fife was earning $5.60 per hour (R.358), 
had a net monthly income of $650.00 per month (R.358) and 
monthly expenses of approximately $1,000.00 (R.373) at the 
time of trial. 
During the parties' marriage, Mr. Fife began a sole 
proprietorship under the name of FIFECO (R.291) in which he 
sought and obtained government contracts (R.393). Mr. Fife 
testified he would consider himself to be "the business of 
FIFECO" (R.435) and that FIFECO "kept no form of books,..." 
(R.417). Mr. Fife paid both personal and business expenses 
from the FIFECO business checking account (R.417). Mr. Fife 
further admitted his gross income was in the sum of 
$200,000.00 per year (R.288) and that he had received at 
least in $190,000.00 in government contracts for the eleven 
(11) months prior to trial (R.292). 
In addition to, and in clarification of, the dollar 
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figures referred to in Mr. Fife's Brief and Addendum I, the 
trial court did not accept Mr. Fife's testimony concerning 
the value of the promissory notes awarded to him. The Court 
heard Mr. Fife testify that he had not made any efforts to 
collect the promissory notes (R.276-278) and Mr. Fife did not 
present any evidence concerning the amount of indebtedness 
that was due and owing on the Park City Condominium awarded 
to him. Mr. Fife's version of the facts and his Addendum I 
also do not reflect the Court's award to him of his 
$205,000.00 interest in the Ranch in Salmon, Idaho (R.175) 
nor the award of his $21,250.00 interest in the Stringham 
Avenue property (R.176). Accordingly, Mrs. Fife submits that 
Addendum A submitted herewith more accurately discloses the 
true distribution of the trial court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in 
dividing the property and assessing the debts. Mr. Fife has 
an admitted better ability to pay the marital debts and has 
over $446,584.00 in assets available to him (See Addendum A). 
When the record is reviewed to determine the evidence 
presented to the trial court, Mr. Fife received a net award 
of property totaling over $380,000.00 and Mrs. Fife's award 
of $203,000.00 pales in comparison. More simply put—Mr. 
Fife is attempting to mathematically manipulate the figures 
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of the trial court to show inequality. The record discloses, 
however, that Mr. Fife was not only treated equally, but more 
importantly, he was treated equitably by the lower court. 
The evidence presented to the lower court fully 
supports the award of permanent alimony of $400.00 per month. 
Mr. Fife has the capacity of earning $200,000.00 yearly and 
has complete control of FIFECO. During the parties1 
marriage, they acquired substantial assets and traveled 
extensively. Moreover, Mrs. Fife was requested to remain at 
home with the parties1 minor children and was not, at the 
time of trial, capable of obtaining sufficient employment to 
maintain the lifestyle she had become accustomed to during 
twenty-six years of marriage. Furthermore, Mrs. Fife's lack 
of work experience, substantial lack of education and 
advanced age make it improbable she will be able to achieve 
her married lifestyle again and the alimony award is 
justified on the facts of this case and the case law in Utah. 
Mrs. Fife, therefore, seeks a determination from this 
Court that the lower court's Decree of Divorce is appropriate 
in all respects and affirmance of the same. Further, Mrs. 
Fife respectfully asks this Court to award her a reasonable 
attorney's fee and costs incurred in connection with this 
appeal. 
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I 
A TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DIVISION SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED SINCE IT IS CLOTHED WITH A PRESUMPTION 
OF VALIDITY AND MR. FIFE HAS FAILED TO 
DEMONSTRATE A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The standard for review of property divisions in a 
divorce case has been succinctly stated by this Court: 
"In reviewing the property division made by the trial 
court, this Court endows its decision with a presumption of 
validity and does not disturb the decree absent a clear abuse 
of discretion or a manifest injustice or inequity." Stephens 
v. Stephens, 45 Utah Adv. Rep. 14(1986) citing Pusey v. 
Pusey, 40 Utah Adv. Rep. 3(1986); Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 22(1986). 
The principal contention of Mr. Fife in this appeal is 
that the trial court's order requiring him to pay most of the 
parties1 marital debts mandates that he should be awarded a 
greater portion of the parties assets. Specifically, Mr. 
Fife requests this Court to award him $112,768.00 of the 
parties marital assets in addition to the $220,334.00 already 
awarded by the lower court. Mr. Fife argues that because he 
has the better ability to pay marital debts and a much 
greater income ($85,000.00 per year as compared to Mrs. 
Fife's annual income of approximately $10,000.00) then the 
trial court should have awarded him a total of $333,102.00 of 
the marital assets. Thus, Mr. Fife asserts that an 
"equitable" division of the marital estate is for the court 
to award him 78% of the marital estate, together with 100% of 
his $226,250.00 inherited property, as "compensation" for the 
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his $226,250.00 inherited property, as "compensation" for the 
requirement that he assume the parties1 marital debts. 
In addition to the clear inequity and manifest 
injustice that is sought by Mr. Fife's proposed property 
distribution, Mr. Fife's argument is flawed in many respects. 
First, Mr. Fife appears to assert that the property and debt 
division must be equal. This argument is not supported by 
Utah case law which has consistently held that an equitable 
distribution is the standard for a property distribution and 
mathematical equality is not required. Sinclair v. Sinclair, 
718 P.2d 396(Utah 1986); Teece v. Teece, 715 P.2d 106(Utah 
1986); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
In the present case, Mr. Fife admits he was awarded 52% 
of the parties' marital assets. He also does not challenge 
the lower court's finding that his average net income is in 
the range of $85,000.00. His annual income is therefore over 
eight times that of Mrs. Fife and he candidly admits this 
Court, in Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), has 
stated the ability to pay marital debts is a relevant factor 
in distributing assets and debts. Mr. Fife suggests, 
however, that this Court should divide the marital debts on 
the same percentages as the assets despite this gross 
disparity in income. With this argument, Mrs. Fife strongly 
disagrees. 
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Mr. Fife has $446,584.00 in assets, both marital assets 
and assets from his inheritance, awarded to him by the trial 
court (see Addendum A). He has a tremendous annual income 
and has the ability to reduce the parties1 marital debts in a 
short time period. In contrast, Mrs. Fife cannot meet her 
monthly expenses of $1,000.00 on a net monthly income of 
$650.00. To award Mrs. Fife only $92,834.00 of the marital 
assets so that Mr. Fife can be treated "equally" on marital 
debts would be a true miscarriage of justice. Further, under 
his proposed distribution, Mr. Fife would leave the marriage 
with over $559,352.00 in assets, including his inheritance. 
This Court should not, in good conscience, sanction the 
abandonment of Mrs. Fife by allowing Mr. Fife to exit a 
marriage after twenty six years with virtually all of the 
accumulated assets. 
An even more important reason that the trial court's 
award should be affirmed is that Mr. Fife's claims on two 
"debts" are not supported by the record below. Specifically, 
mr. Fife asserts the promissory notes with face values of 
$73,160.00 are worthless. Mr. Fife's argument ignores, 
however, his candid admission that he had not pursued any 
collection efforts on those notes (R.276-278). Furthermore, 
both of the promissory notes are secured by trust deeds on 
real property (R.276-278). In view of his own admissions, 
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the trial court apparently chose not to believe Mr. Fife's 
bald, uncorroborated assertion that the notes were worthless. 
This court should not overturn the trial judge's assessment 
of Mr. Fife's credability on this issue. 
Mr. Fife also asserts there exists a $131,023.00 
obligation on the Park City Condo awarded to him. The 
record, however, does not disclose any evidence presented by 
Mr. Fife on the amount of the debt and the trial court made 
no finding as to the amount of that encumbrance. Moreover, 
Mr. Fife should not now be permitted to complain about the 
inadequacy of this finding because it resulted from his own 
failure to present evidence on the issues and no objection to 
that particular finding was raised by trial counsel in her 
extensive objections to the final pleadings submitted to the 
court (R.142-145 and 159-161). 
The trial court's property distribution and debt 
assessment, although not mathematically equal, is more than 
equitable in view of the disparate earning capacities of the 
parties and the more than double amount of assets available 
to Mr. Fife. The trial court's decision should be affirmed. 
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II 
MR. FIFE HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND THE AWARD SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
For Mr. Fife to prevail on this appeal concerning the 
award of alimony, he must show a "clear and prejudicial abuse 
of discretion," Claus v. Claus, 39 Utah Adv. Rep. 39,40(Utah 
1986) (citing Higly v. Higly, 676 P.2d 379(1983)) and the 
burden is on Mr. Fife "to show that the evidence does not 
support the findings." Claus, at 40 (citing Graff v. Graff, 
699 P.2d 765(Utah 1985) . 
The case of Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072(1986), 
contrary to Mr. Fife's Brief, is very analogous to the 
present facts. In Jones, the wife was awarded no income 
producing assets, was married at a relatively young age, she 
had devoted most of the parties twenty-nine (29) years of 
marriage to raising the parties' children and had no 
professional training or marketable skills. In the case at 
bar, Mrs. Fife was awarded some income producing assets in 
the form of stock but the remaining income producing assets 
(namely, FIFECO, the trust deed notes and the Park City 
Condo) were awarded to Mr. Fife. The parties married when 
Mrs. Fife was twenty-one (21) years old and she testified she 
devoted most of her twenty-seven (27) years of marriage to 
being a wife and homemaker. Moreover, Mrs. Fife does not 
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have any marketable skills and, given her age, is probably 
relegated to working in unskilled positions like the one she 
currently holds. 
Furthermore, when viewing the evidence on each of the 
factors set forth in Jones, the award is justified. Mrs. 
Fife clearly has financial need for support as evidenced by 
the shortfall between her income of $650.00 and her monthly 
expenses of $1,000.00. Additionally, the parties became 
accustomed to a very comfortable lifestyle due to the success 
of FIFECO resulting in substantial assets and much vacation 
traveling. 
As to the second factor in Jones, Mrs. Fife does not 
have the ability to provide support for herself due to her 
insufficient training, lack of education and age thereby 
preventing her from having any reasonable expectation of 
obtaining employment that will enable her to support herself 
at a standard of living even approaching that she had during 
their marriage. 
Finally, Mr. Fife's annual income of $85,000.00 clearly 
supports a determination that he has the ability to pay 
alimony. Mr. Fife has not challenged the lower court's 
finding or this issue. 
Mr. Fife asserts that because the trial court awarded 
alimony in an amount more•than that prayed for in the 
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complaint, there must be some error. Mr. Fife ignores, 
however, the fact that Mrs. Fife alleged no knowledge of the 
extent of marital assets in her complaint at paragraph 13 
(R.4). Mrs. Fife, nor her counsel, did not, therefore, have 
the ability to determine what would be an appropriate request 
for alimony at the time of filing of the complaint. The 
trial court, however, had full benefit of the discovery and 
investigation done by Mrs. Fife's counsel that brought to 
light many non-disclosures on his part. Such an award is 
therefore appropriate. 
Mr. Fife alleges he is being punished by the lower 
court's alimony award. Irrespective of the trial court's 
interpretation of Mr. Fife's actions, the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates Mrs. Fife is entitled to permanent alimony. 
Furthermore, that specific findings were not made on each 
factor is not fatal to the lower court's analysis inasmuch as 
the trial judge did not have the benefit of the Jones 
decision and the record, as shown herein, clearly supports an 
award under the Jones analysis (see Olson v. Olson, 15 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 8 (1986)). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's decision is supported by both the 
facts presented at trial and the case law in Utah. The lower 
court's decision should be affirmed and Mrs. Fife should be 
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awarded her reasonable attorney's fee and costs incurred in 
connection with this appeal. 
DATED this :J(j day of November, 1986. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. "Norde/Il Weeks 
Phillip W. Dyer 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Erfife.bri 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
Awarded 
Assets 
Home 2410 Evergreen 
Furniture 
Mercedes 
Granada 
Stock 
Snowbird Condominium 
Antique Dolls 
Train Set 
Cash 
TOTAL TO MRS. FIFE: 
to Mrs. Fife 
Value of 
Assets 
$130,000 
12,500 
12,550 
1,843 
28,809 
7,000 
3,000 
1,500 
8,400 
$205,602 
Debt Against 
Assets 
$ 32 
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
894 
-0-
-0-
-0-
$ 1,726 
Awarded to Mr. Fife 
GMC Truck 
Thunderbird 
Ford Pickup 
Audi 
Boat 
Camper 
Inventory and Equipment 
Life Insurance Policy 
Limited Partnership 
Park City Condominium 
Trust Deeds 
SUBTOTAL: 
Salmon Ranch 
Stringham Avenue 
TOTAL TO MR. FIFE 
$ 2,610 
675 
675 
65 
1,200 
550 
2,644 
988 
30,767 
107,000 
73,160 
$446,584 
205,000 
21,250 
$446,584 
$ -0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
17,011 
-0-
43,856 
-0-
-0-
$ 60,867 
-0-
-0-
$ fin.Rfi? 
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